

Analogia entis v nominalistické tradici.

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**ANALOGIA ENTIS IN THE NOMINALIST
TRADITION. MARGINAL NOTES ON
FOURTEENTH-CENTURY SEMANTICS**

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ABSTRAKT

The problem of the analogy of being is at an intersection of ontology and semantics. It can be motivated by the following aporia: the assumptions that “being” is meaningful and transcendental and that every super-ordinate concept decomposes into specific concepts by means of specific differences are inconsistent. The solution is to reconsider the semantics of “being” or the theory of the generality of concepts. Since the thirteenth century, the former was associated with the view that the concept of being is transcendental but (systematically) ambiguous, while the latter with the view that the concept of being is transcendental and unambiguous but does not decompose into sub-ordinate concepts in the same way as generic concepts decompose into specific ones. One of the achievements of fourteenth-century nominalism was an emphasis on semantics, which made it possible to re-formulate the analogy of being in rigorous logico-semantic terms. Second, the combination of Eucharistic ontology and a weak ontology of accidental beings led to a re-statement of the problem in a bottom-up fashion and to its re-construction into a theorem of the semantics and ontology of accidents.