The Monstrosity of Vice: Sin and Slavery in Campanella's Political Thought

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ABSTRACT

This paper opens by reviewing Aristotle's conception of the natural slave and then familiar treatments of the internal conflict between the ruling and subject parts of the soul in Aristotle and Plato; I highlight especially the figurative uses of slavery and servitude when discussing such problems pertaining to incontinence and vice—viz., being a 'slave' to the passions. Turning to Campanella, features of the *City of the Sun* pertaining to slavery are examined: in sketching his ideal city, Campanella both rejects Aristotle's natural slave and is critical of the European institutions of slavery. The fact that slavery has no place in the City of the Sun takes on added significance when complemented with Campanella's remarks on dominion and servitude in his *Quaestiones de politiciis*: I show that Campanella's conception of slavery is intimately bound to sin, and consider whether his employment of the trope of slavery within the context of vice diverges from familiar usage.

—— SLAVERY AND FIGURATIVE USES OF SLAVERY IN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO

Many philosophical considerations of the theme of slavery in antiquity will inevitably, and naturally, look to Aristotle's treatment of the natural slave in *Politics* I. There we quickly learn that while a natural ruler is capable of rational foresight, those who are (only?) able to physically carry out labor are natural subjects and slaves.¹ A more thorough treatment of the slave follows in chapters 3–7, though it has been remarked that this so-called treatise on slavery “does not offer a freestanding analysis of slavery, but rather an auxiliary study meant to shed light on things other than the

properties and the nature of servitude.”² Nonetheless, we should be able to abstract some clear conclusions concerning slavery. Without being exhaustive, these include: (1) the slave is an animate possession or piece of property, and more specifically a living tool³; (2) the one who is by nature not his own but rather someone else's is by nature a slave⁴;

2 Pellegrin 2013, p. 93. Pellegrin remarks that the treatment here amounts to a critique of the Platonic view, with Aristotle arguing that the different forms of rule are different in kind: “Slavery, then, acts in the *Politics*, as a kind of theoretical foil for the work's central question, the question of *political power*.” Heath 2008 also recognizes that the question of slavery there is “incidental,” offering a “sketch of the theory,” p. 244.

3 *Pol.* I.4, 1253^{b30}.

4 *Pol.* I.4, 1254^{a15}.

1 *Pol.* I.2, 1252^{a31}.

(3) it is better for the natural slave—as naturally inferior—to be subjected to the rule of a master, and by being ruled he shares and participates in the reason of the master⁵; (4) it is possible to speak of legal slavery (or slavery by convention) in which the one in the state of servitude may not be a natural slave.⁶ Later on, when discussing the character of a democratic state, Aristotle notes that the mark of liberty is that a man should live as he likes, “since not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave.”⁷

Outside of the *Politics*, Aristotle often speaks of slavery in a matter of fact and unsentimental manner. Aristotle very plainly enlists the master-slave relationship alongside that of double-half and larger-smaller as examples of relatives in the *Categories*.⁸ When discussing the goodness and orderliness of nature, Aristotle employs an analogy of a house: “But it is as in a house, where the freemen are least at liberty to act as they will, but all things or most things are ordained for them, while slaves and the beasts do little for the common good, and for the most part live at random; for this is the sort of principle that constitutes the nature of each.”⁹ This here perhaps recalls the implied claim from the *Politics* that slaves are not capable of rational foresight. When discussing the process of nourishment, Aristotle—in

a peculiar analogy—likens nature to the good householder who does not throw out useful portions: “Now in a household the best part of the food that comes in is set apart for the freemen, the inferior and the residue of the best for the slaves, and the worst is given to the animals that live with them.”¹⁰ At least here the slaves are given an elevated status to the beasts. And in the *Ethics*, while Aristotle does allow for friendship with a slave insofar as he is a man, friendship is explicitly denied *qua* slave furnishing the claim that the slave is an animate tool.¹¹ In these cases, Aristotle’s employment of slavery points directly to the condition of servitude, especially in the context of the household.

Aristotle, however, also employs slavery in a figurative and analogical manner. When discussing the effects of fear in the *Rhetoric*, he remarks that most men tend to be slaves to greed; similarly, when comparing old age and youth, the claim is made that while most think that the elderly have a self-controlled character, in reality their passions have only died down and they have instead become slaves to the love of gain.¹² Such uses do not point to legal or *de facto* servitude, but rather are images which signify a loss of liberty (but not to another person or institution), an inability to rule oneself, and a situation in which the ‘ruler’ (a vice) in fact ought not rule. The said person is *as if* a slave to his greed. When returning

5 *Pol.* I.5, 1254^{b20}, 1255^{b1}. On this point, teasing out the peculiarity of the claim, see Heath 2008, pp. 265–267.

6 *Pol.* I.6, 1255^{a4}, 1255^{b5}

7 *Pol.* VI.2, 1317^{b10}, trans. Jowett, p. 2091.

8 *Catg.* VII, 6^{b30}, trans. Ackrill, p. 11.

9 *Meta.* XII.10, 1075^{a20}, trans. Ross, p. 1699.

10 *GA* II, 744^{b17}, trans. Platt, p. 1155.

11 *NE* VIII.11, 1161^{b2}.

12 *Rhet.* II.5, 1382^{b5}; II.13, 1390^{a13}.

to the theme of pleasure at the end of the *Ethics*, Aristotle says: “For some say pleasure is the good, while others, on the contrary, say it is thoroughly bad—some no doubt being persuaded that the facts are so, and others thinking it has a better effect on our life to exhibit pleasure as a bad thing even if it is not; for most people (they think) incline towards it and are slaves of their pleasures, for which reason they ought to lead them in the opposite direction, since thus they will reach the middle state.”¹³ Aristotle will reject that position, proceeding as he does in a dialectical manner; nonetheless, the image—being a slave to pleasure—holds up. In fact, it is precisely in the context of self-control, temperance, and continence where the image of slavery has its strength; or rather, the lack of self-control, intemperance, and incontinence. Aristotle’s earlier treatment of continence and incontinence, states positioned between virtue and viciousness, was an answer to a problem Plato had pointed to in a number of different ways: how is it possible that someone can act contrariwise while possessing the knowledge (perhaps even only correct belief) of the right or good course of action? Aristotle begins his discussion in his usual manner: “Now we may ask what kind of right belief is possessed by the man who behaves incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange—so Socrates thought—if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it

about like a slave.”¹⁴ Here, of course, the simile is explicit: pleasures, passions, and bodily desires ought not rule insofar as they are inferior; if they did, the intellectual, superior part having knowledge would be *as if* a slave. Aristotle’s solution, as is well known, allows for the possibility that man abandon his rational calculations.

Aristotle of course is not alone in employing this telling image pertaining to self-control or self-rule. The passage Aristotle referred to in the *Ethics*—“drag it about like a slave”—comes from the *Protagoras*, where Socrates explicitly refers to the passions (anger, pleasure, pain, love, fear) as ruling a man instead of knowledge: “they think of his knowledge as being utterly dragged around by all these other [passions] as if it were a slave.”¹⁵ This certainly is not the only such use in Plato. Famously, in the *Republic*, in what may be the culmination of the argument against injustice which highlights the character and wretched condition of the tyrannical man, Socrates draws the parallel between the tyrant and the tyrannical regime: “Then, if man and city are alike, mustn’t the same structure be in him too? And mustn’t his soul be full of slavery and unfreedom, with the most decent parts enslaved and with a small part, the maddest and most vicious, their master?”¹⁶ That a soul

14 NE VII.2, 1145^{b22}, trans. Ross, p. 1809. See also *Prob.* XXVIII: “So we blame a man who is slave to [pleasures] and call him incontinent and intemperate, because he is a slave to the worst pleasures,” 949^{b10}, trans. Forster, p. 216.

15 *Prot.* 352^c, trans. Lombardo & Bell, p. 782.

16 *Rep.* IX, 577^d, trans. Grube, p. 1185.

13 NE X.1, 1172^{a27}, trans. Ross, p. 1853.

be “full of slavery” implies precisely an improper ordering among ruling and subject parts. (Elsewhere, in a beautiful moment of irony, Socrates points out to Lysis the peculiarity of the slave-teacher: “a free man directed by a slave? Are they not in charge of you?”¹⁷) It is enough to be mastered by but one pleasure to become a slave to oneself.¹⁸ Such a kind of slavery comes most into relief precisely in the case of incontinence, where one acts contrariwise to their reasoned intentions: he is thus not able to live as he likes.

In the *Republic*, Socrates concludes that the real tyrant is in fact a slave, unable to satisfy his desires and filled with fear, governed poorly “on the inside”—whereas the democratic man, for example, insofar as his enjoyment of pleasures is moderate, leads a life that is neither slavish nor lawless.¹⁹ Even with such a strong condemnation of the tyrant, and equally strong claim that the tyrant is *actually* a slave, an unspoken ‘as if’ seems to linger in the background and such a use of slavery remains secondary and at the level of a metaphor. For less literary uses in Plato, one need only consult the treatment of the training and punishment of slaves by the unnamed

Athenian in *Laws*.²⁰ Slaves there are always actual slaves of a household, and not intemperate and greedy fellows prone to backsliding in the garb of free-men. When Clitophon, commenting on Socrates’ own words, suggests that slavery rather than freedom is preferred for the one who does not know how to use his soul well, “handing over the rudder of his mind [...] to somebody else who knows the skill of steering men [...]”,²¹ there too a condition of real servitude or subjection is indicated, though the figurative sense is not excluded since he cannot rule himself. Better for the ‘slave’ to be a slave? Have we circled round to a version of Aristotle’s natural slave?

— SLAVERY AND THE CITY OF THE SUN

We have so far highlighted analogical uses of slavery when applied to the human soul and the ability and difficulty in ruling one’s self in some familiar Aristotelian and Platonic texts. We turn now to the political thought of the late Renaissance Dominican, Tommaso Campanella, whose body of work is prolific as it is extensive, and whose thinking resists facile demarcation. While he wrote on nearly all aspects of learning—metaphysics, natural philosophy, astrology, theology, religion, and ethics—perhaps it is his political thought which stands out to contemporary readers given the popularity of his peculiar ‘utopian’ work, *The City of the Sun* (1602). Ever the critic of Aristotle and stale Aristotelian

17 *Lysis*, 208^c, trans. Lombardo, p. 693.

18 In *Alc.* 1, the heir to the Persian throne is trained by four royal tutors—the most wise, the most just, the most brave, and the most self-controlled. The latter teaches the boy “not to be mastered by even a single pleasure, so that he can get accustomed to being a freeman and a real king, whose first duty is to rule himself, not to be a slave to himself,” 122^a, trans. Hutchinson, p. 579.

19 *Rep.* IX, 572^b, 578^e.

20 *Laws* VI, 777ff.

21 *Clit.*, 408b, trans. Gonzalez, p. 967.

doctrine in matters of physics and metaphysics, Campanella's distaste for the Stagirite does not exempt his political philosophy, and comes to the fore in his fierce rejection of the natural slave.²² After presenting significant features of his *City of the Sun* which have to do with slavery, we will then turn to his theoretical treatments in a companion work and examine whether or not Campanella follows suit in employing the familiar figurative or analogical uses of slavery. His persistence in or divergence from the standard trope might shed further light on his understanding of servitude and conventional practices. To anticipate, it does turn out that his conception of slavery as such fits directly into the context not only of vice, but also sin.

The *City of the Sun* is Campanella's well-known 'poetic dialogue' on the idea of a commonwealth (*de Reipublicae Idea*). In a conversation between a Genoese helmsman and a Grand Hospitaller, Campanella presents details concerning the structure of this ideal city, the Solarian way of life generally and its political governance, their educational practices and military training, and their philosophical and religious beliefs. The city is meant to be in conformity with natural law and natural religion, and is presented as more just and humane than contemporary European cities.

In the dialogue, the Hospitaller displays much eagerness to learn more about the City of the Sun. He more than once asks for further information

concerning their government and way of life. In response to one of these demands—still early in the dialogue, though following the introduction of the ruler-priest called the Metaphysician and his three auxiliary princes, Power, Wisdom, and Love, as well as the detailed description of the seven city walls and the various divisions of knowledge depicted on the six inner ones—the Genoese reveals that the Solarians are a people from India who fled a devastated region. In particular, they are refugees from the rule of tyrants: as a result, the Solarians decided to establish a "philosophical life in community" (*philosophicam vitam in communitate/viver alla filosofica in comune*).²³ This communal way of life constitutes a distinctive and essential feature of the city: there is no private property, but rather all goods are shared insofar as they are received from the community (since the Solarians produce always a surplus of goods), dispensed by officials who ensure that no one person receive more or less than what is deserved or needed. Learning, honors, and pleasures are all held in common, as are wives following a practice that perhaps is reminiscent of *Republic V*. The Solarians believe that property—the possession of goods, holding individual homes, and even recognizing children and wives as one's own—lies at the root of selfish love and in fact inflames the love of self: "when we have freed ourselves from the selfish love, all that remains is the love

22 See, for example, Mahoney 2004, esp. pp. 29–32 for a concise treatment of Campanella.

23 Campanella 2008, p. 20

of community.”²⁴ In fact, the social and pedagogical structures of the city have as their aim precisely the elimination of vice, in particular pride and greed.

With the elimination of all conceptions of property, so much so that even the family unit is unrecognizable, we can infer that the slave—at least the Aristotelian version of the slave—can in no way find a place in such a society. If there is no property in the City of the Sun, and a slave is an animate piece of property, there can be no slave in the City of the Sun. As it turns out, we learn in fact that the Solarians do not practice slavery. Working through the few explicit references to slaves, slavery, and subjection in the *City of the Sun*, we can briefly outline the following points: (1) the Solarians believe that the keeping of slaves leads to idleness and licentiousness in a given society; (2) the practice of slavery brings with it the corruption of morals (*foedantia mores*)²⁵; (3) with respect to the communal production and distribution of goods, the Solarians are at the same time rich and poor, and thus are not enslaved to things (*rebus non serviunt/non s’attaccano a servire in ogni cosa*)²⁶; and (4) concerning their trade and dealings with other regions and peoples, foreigners and their slaves are not allowed into the city, but rather are consigned to a space at or outside the city gates.

The first explicit mention of slaves (*servos/servidori*) occurs in the early account of how the magistrates are chosen. Before the Genoese sailor answers the Hospitaller’s query directly, he first tells more generally of the Solarian lifestyle, their clothes, and methods of instruction. Led by masters, groups of Solarian children are instructed in language, exercise in gymnastics, and then practice various crafts according to their innate inclinations that are carefully monitored and evaluated by the masters. Even after the youth begin their study of mathematics and the natural sciences, they engage always in some physical exercise after their lectures. Those most proficient in a given mechanical art or science themselves will become masters of that respective discipline. It is here that we learn that the Solarians consider most noble the one who learns the most arts or crafts and practices them with expertise. Here the Genoese says: “On account of this it is they who laugh at us, for we refer to artisans as ignoble and hold to be noble those who have learned no craft, who live leisurely, and who keep so many slaves for their own idleness and licentiousness, as from this school of vices spring up many idlers and criminals who are a calamity for the commonwealth.”²⁷ In this first use of *servus* in the text, then, the slave

24 “At cum proprium amorem amiserimus, remanet tantummodo amor communitatis,” Campanella 2008, p. 20. Cf. also Campanella 1637, Q.4, a.3, p. 110.

25 Campanella 2008, p. 54.

26 Campanella 2008, p. 56.

27 “Quapropter irrident nos in eo quod artifices vocemus ignobiles ac eos habemus nobiles, qui nullam addiscunt artem, vivunt ociose et tot servos suo ocio et lasciviae dedicatos detinent, unde sicut ex vitiorum schola prodeunt in reipublicae perniciem tot nebulones ac malefici,” Campanella 2008, p. 28.

referred to is the European one: the Solarians denounce the European practice as a source of ruin for the state insofar as it nourishes idleness and decadence. Campanella's elevation of the status of artisans, craftsmen, and labor in general in his city constitutes a rejection and criticism of Aristotle's exclusion of artisans and workers from the class of citizens found in the *Politics*.²⁸

Later in the text, slavery (*mancipia/schiavi*) appears explicitly following the strong condemnation of the vice of pride. Pride is chastised with the harshest contempt, and no labor in the city—such as waiting on tables or working in the kitchens—is deemed unworthy or ignoble. Any such service they call “discipline,” and Campanella offers the following elegant examples: “they say that it is honorable for the feet to walk and for the anus to defecate, just as it is

for the eye to see and for the tongue to speak: for even these latter functions [...] discharge excrement when it is necessary. Therefore, whoever is assigned to whatever service works at it as if it were the most honorable task.”²⁹ We see again not a denigration of, but a genuine appreciation for all sorts of labor in the city. The Solarians are sufficient unto themselves and in fact produce a surplus of goods. The Genoese then introduces a comparison with Naples: he says that of the seventy-thousand souls residing in Naples, fewer than ten or fifteen thousand of these engage in labor, and that these are exhausted and ruined by an excess of uninterrupted and prolonged work.³⁰ The many vices among the non-working idlers are condemned—they are lost to sloth, avarice, sickness of body, licentiousness, usury; these idlers contaminate and pervert the others by detaining them in their servitude and reducing them to poverty. On the other hand, in the City of the Sun, the duties, crafts, and labors are distributed throughout the entire city, each person working for hardly four hours a day (even an improvement upon More's six-hour workday in *Utopia*); the remaining hours of the day are devoted to joyous leisure, learning, exercise, and

28 While there are implicit criticisms of Aristotle and his political philosophy in the *City of the Sun*, there are also explicit rejections of Aristotle as an authority: for example, the Solarians refuse to call the Stagirite a philosopher, and believe that the European dependence upon Aristotle's grammar and logic only leads to a stagnation of intellect. Besides these remarks in the *City of the Sun*, Campanella takes up these theoretical issues more directly in his *Quaestiones de politiciis*, the second of which is dedicated precisely to refuting Aristotle's political philosophy. John Headley rightly insists that “the *Quaestiones* [as a whole] need to be judged against the lifelong opposition of their author to the formidable Stagirite,” Headley 1991, p. 29. Precisely when expressing his disagreement and disgust over Aristotle's devaluation of the crafts and the place of the artisans, Campanella refers to Aristotle in Q.2, a.1: “Aristoteles impius, naturae humanae hostis,” Campanella 1637, p. 93.

29 “Sed vocant disciplinam onme ministerium et aiunt ita honorificum esse pedi ambulare et culo cacare, sicut oculo videre et linguae loqui: nam ille lacrymas et ista sputum, excrementa excernunt, cum opus est. Idcirco cuicumque quilibet ministerio deputatus operatur illud tanquam honestissimum,” Campanella 2008, p. 54.

30 Tangentially, it should be noted that Campanella's statistical figures vary in the Italian and Latin versions of the text.

games. The crux of this point is that the Solarians participate in their respective labor in a communal fashion, producing even a surplus and making slavery in fact unnecessary. On this point, Blum has commented that with such a conception of labor and communal duty, the very existence of slavery in a society is indicative of insufficiency and incompetency, such that “slavery is the expression of a surplus that is enjoyed by one part of the population at the expense of the laboring part. Accordingly, such surplus could be distributed equally among the populace, which would amount to all citizens working and enjoying leisure at their fair share.”³¹ Campanella goes on to make the claim—through the mouth of the Genoese—that harsh poverty makes any man vile, cunning, deceitful, scandalous, and insidious, while exorbitant wealth makes man insolent, arrogant, ignorant, fraudulent, and boastful. Thus we see that a city is indeed deficient not simply when one class exploits the labor of another, but rather when its people are equally subjected to vice, albeit different ones. The ruling and rich class only apparently benefits from the labor of the subjected and poor class. It is not just that the slaves are exploited and made vicious, but rather that the masters too are corrupted by their attachment to their wealth. It is on this point that the Genoese remarks that the Solarian communal life renders each citizen to be at the same time rich and poor, “rich since they have everything, and poor because they possess nothing;

and therefore they are not enslaved to things, but things are at their service [...]”—and here we happen upon a figurative expression of servitude (so long as we are able to treat *non serviunt* in this way) in the text.³² It is not an inversion between ruling and subject parts of the human soul, but rather an inverted relationship between person and thing: the rich and poor alike, in their conventional meanings, inevitably are put into the service of things.

A final reference to slaves (*mancipia/schiavi*) occurs in the Genoese’s consideration of the Solarians’ trade practices and use of money. Commerce (*mercatura*) is for them of little use, he says. They do recognize the value of money and mint coins for the sake of their emissaries and spies; merchants from other parts of the world buy the Solarians’ surplus of goods. However, they themselves do not accept money, but rather trade for items they might lack, and oftentimes themselves buy such things with money. The youth of the City of the Sun erupt into laughter when they see foreign merchants bestow a great amount of goods for so small a price. Here the Genoese states that the Solarians “refuse that slaves and strangers corrupt the city with their immoral behavior. They thus buy or sell those they capture in war only at the city gates, or they assign them to dig ditches or to other laborious work outside of the

31 Blum 2017, p. 565.

32 “divites quia omnia habent, pauperes quoniam nihil possident; ac simul rebus non serviunt sed res ipsis, et in hoc valde laudant religiosos christianitatis, maxime autem vitam Apostolorum,” Campanella 2008, p. 56.

city [...].”³³ The little dealings they have with slaves captured in war are wholly kept outside of the city walls. We might add, importantly, that elsewhere (in his *Quaestiones de politiciis*, a text we will soon consider in more detail) Campanella concedes that the keeping of captives as slaves is a lesser evil, and is a necessary consequence that follows from the fact that man engages in warfare.³⁴ The *City of the Sun* says little else, however it seems clear that such slaves or prisoners of war are quickly sold off (since they cannot be integrated well into the Solarian lifestyle and practices) and repeat that such slaves can only be the belligerents, and are not Solarians as the practice simply has no place inside the city. We might also infer that if the Solarians never engaged in battle with any neighbor, they themselves would never hold any slaves whatsoever.

CAMPANELLA ON SLAVERY AND SIN

The *City of the Sun* was not a self-standing speculative or satirical exercise, but rather constituted a kind of poetic appendix to Campanella's political thought

as expressed in the work *De politica*. Additionally, in the 1637 edition of his *Philosophia realis* (dedicated to natural philosophy, ethics, political philosophy, and economics), Campanella's *De politica* and *Civitas solis* are in fact rounded off by the *Quaestiones de politiciis*—the fourth and final question dedicated precisely to a defense of his ideal city against a number of objections. The third question aims to show the many ways in which Aristotle's own vision of the polis is contradictory, while the second question is a broader rejection of Aristotle's political philosophy. For present purposes, we wish to draw attention to the first of these political *quaestiones*, in which we can clarify Campanella's understanding of the relation between vice, servitude, and sin.³⁵

The first question is divided into two articles, the first asking whether to reign (*regnare*) and to have dominion (*dominari*) are the same thing. Campanella makes some important distinctions concerning relevant terminology—i.e., *dominium*, *usufructus*, *usus*, *ius*, and *regnum*. This is done to clarify his conception of tyranny as distinct from correct and legitimate rule. Campanella posits that reign (*regnum*) is a combination of right (*ius*) and dominion (*dominium*). Already here we find some important claims that will later furnish the ground for his rejection of natural slavery. Dominion is characterized as a relationship between superior and inferior, and only God possesses dominion in an absolute

33 “Nolunt a mancipiis et advenis civitatem pravis moribus labefactari. Idcirco mercantur in portis et vendunt quod bello capiunt aut excavandis fossis aut operosis laboribus extra civitatem ipsos destinant [...],” Campanella 2008, p. 78–80.

34 As will be emphasized in the next section, warfare and this lesser evil is a consequence of sin, and Campanella encourages that the captives be improved: “At quoniam peccata hominum sic ferunt, ut contra invicem bellum geramus, melius est captivare quam occidere: hoc est minus malum, sed meliores reddere captivos, si studueris, hoc probitatis erit,” Campanella 1637, Q.1, a.2, p. 85.

35 For a brief overview of the *Quaestiones*, see Ernst's “Presentazione,” in Campanella 2013, pp. 592–600.

manner; the legitimate ruler has dominion only in a participatory way and does not act in an arbitrary fashion; this legitimate form of rule (i.e., *regnum*) necessitates right (*ius*) insofar as men are equals, and without right such rule becomes tyranny, constituting rather a violation of right when a ruler does not aim at the good of the people. Campanella remarks that when a man acts contrary to human reason and introduces harm into his country and among his countrymen, “he is stripped of his humanity and clothes himself with what is bestial.”³⁶ Although man is given dominion over the fish, the birds, and the terrestrial beasts (Gen. 1), man does not have dominion over man: unless, Campanella says, a man has made himself a beast through beastly acts (*nisi fiant bestiae per actus bestiales*), in which case Campanella does allow a ‘medicinal’ form of dominion which either punishes, corrects, or prevents sin. In short, the relationship between men is one between equals in which there is no natural superiority or inferiority; any legitimate form of political rule, then, must always be restrained by law and never be simply arbitrary. It is through sinful acts that man becomes as if a beast, and deserves punishment or correction for the good of the commonwealth, thus being subjected to a medicinal form of dominion—which Campanella notes “seems to be something more than government.”³⁷

36 “exuitur humanitate et vestitur bestialitate,” Campanella 1637, Q.1, a.1, p. 73.

37 “medicinali, quod aliquid plus videtur, quam regimen,” Campanella 1637, Q. 1, a.1, p. 73.

The second article then moves to clarify the following questions: whether any man is able to be lord or master over another by some right, natural or divine? And, whether every form of dominion arises from violence? What follows is a very lengthy treatment in which Campanella presents and then takes on three distinct ‘opinions’ on the matter.³⁸ The first opinion argues that all dominion is violent and against nature; the second opinion is that dominion is the highest good and therefore natural, which, for Campanella, serves as the position of the Machiavellians; and the third is that dominion is natural since man is a political animal—this representing the Aristotelian position.

The core presentation of Campanella’s answer is found at the midpoint of the article, after a *sed contra* which offers relevant biblical passages as well as comments of Ambrose, and before the responses to the three opinions. The opening text there is powerful, engaging the reader in the second person and offering a glimpse into a struggle between the commands of reason and those of our ‘mistress’—viz., avarice personified. The reader is cast as an obedient slave to the monster avarice, despite the directives given by reason and by God. All vices deform life (*deturpant vitam*) and

38 Since the *Quaestiones* follow a scholastic presentation of objections and replies, the second article in particular becomes somewhat amplified since each opinion (which functions itself as a sort of ‘objection’) lists a number of different opposing arguments, and then each response contains a kind of ‘corpus’ answering the whole of the opinion as well as individual responses to the specific arguments.

make man unhappy (*faciunt infelicem*). Campanella goes on to reify all vices as monsters, rendering the man unable to dominate his passions crippled, a vile slave in the service of such monstrous creatures. Campanella asks: "would you consider someone to be a master or a freeman if he serve these [monsters]?"³⁹ The tyrant again thus becomes the slave: "Nero [...] was enslaved to the appetite and its miseries,"⁴⁰ while Paul, though imprisoned, remained a master. Nero finds a place among Cesare Borgia, Liverotto da Fermo, and others, cast as the most unhappy of men. The familiar trope has here resurfaced and has been amplified. But we should pay attention to the precise claims made about what servitude consists in and its relationship to sin.

Campanella's response proper to the question at hand (viz., whether a man is able to be a master or possess dominion over another by some right) first affirms that all men share in reason, and thus participate in Christ: as such all are capable of beatitude by obeying God's law and thus becoming virtuous. He continues: "To obey, however, is common to both slaves and freemen, neither does assistance lack for those who desire it. For this reason, no one is a slave in the law of Christ, the highest reason, except he who sins, and thus he said: 'whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin.' It is shown clearly that this alone

is servitude. For the virtuous man is free, since he does not sin by obeying the passions, but rather dominates them. But what is more vile than submitting oneself to the most shameful avarice?"⁴¹ Campanella joins the task of acquiring virtue with obedience to the law of God, and such obedience applies to all, whether free or slave in the conventional sense: this includes, then, the apparent masters and lords. Surely there do not exist slaves by nature since, *qua* man, all participate in reason and in Christ. (Only a small inference is required to determine that, on this basis, a conception of natural master can neither stand.) Invoking scripture (viz., Jn. 8:24), Campanella posits that what servitude consists in simply is sin. We should take this claim seriously. To be free, one pursues virtue and thus obeys God; to obey the passions instead, one sins, and is a slave. It seems that a figurative expression is here jettisoned.

What follows is precisely the dialogue between reason and lady avarice already indicated above, which of course is poetic, turning vices into foul monsters. However, in that passage the images of monstrosity reinforce the claim that sin is servitude: it is not that the man of vice is *as if* a slave to monsters,

39 "Tu ne putabis dominum et liberum, qui his serviet?" Campanella 1637, Q.1, a.2, p. 80.

40 "Nero [...] serviebat gulae suisque miseriis," Campanella 1637, Q.1, a.2, p. 80.

41 "Obedire autem servis et liberis est commune, nec auxilium deest volentibus. Quapropter in lege Christi, Rationis summae, nemo servus, nisi qui peccat, unde dixit: 'Qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati.' Convincitur autem haec sola servitus esse. Nam virtuosus ideo liber, quia non peccat obediendo passionibus sed illis dominatur. Quid autem vilius quam parere turpissimae Avaritiae?" Campanella 1637, Q.1, a.2, p. 79.

but rather that the man of sin is *in fact* a slave and servant to monstrous vice insofar as he fails in his obedience to God.

We must deal with conventional, legal, and *de facto* servitude, which will reinforce the claim that Campanella conceives of slavery primarily as sin. The short answer is that, for Campanella, all forms of slavery are consequent upon the fall: “servitude and dominion were made in the state of corrupted nature, after man had sinned.”⁴² Similarly, and interestingly, even legitimate forms of rule become necessary only after the fall, when the weak and sinful require the care, supervision, and correction by the wise. But again, rule over one’s self (i.e., dominating one’s own passions) is a prerequisite for ruling over others.

Perhaps shockingly at first glance, Campanella does introduce the concession that some might be considered instruments or slaves by nature: here Campanella emphasizes that he does not mean ‘by nature’ in an absolute consideration, but rather in a qualified respect. Campanella refers to the state of affairs following the fall and original sin. Again, the point is that sin simply is servitude. The one who rejects God, wishing to rule himself not restrained by any law, serves his passions instead and enters a state of sin and servitude. The resulting necessity that some ought to be ruled by a legitimate governor stems from sin and the corrupted state, and the resulting form of rule is not absolute dominion (belonging only to God),

but rather government or regime. Thus the vicious and wicked stand in need of not only punishment in extreme cases, but also direction and correction: “the virtuous man makes men good while he utilizes them: for he teaches them, preserves them, and cherishes them through correct doctrine, example, discourse, and correction.”⁴³ Such a form of dominion is medicinal and aimed at the good of the whole, and the wise man possesses such dominion as a physician and not a tyrant. Again, even this dominion comes to be only as a result of original sin.

We are left to consider the significance of these claims when turning back to the *City of the Sun*. In both texts Campanella is explicit that the social structures, the removal of property, and instructional practices of the city have as their end the destruction of vices and the elimination of evils, in order that the citizens live a life more in line with nature—viz., a philosophical and communal way of life. But is there no sin at all? We might be tempted to think that the Solarians in fact live a life without sin, especially given the fact that they do not practice conventional forms of slavery. If we take Campanella’s claim seriously that servitude consists in sin, this would be a tidy conclusion: to say that there is no slavery in the city is tantamount to claiming that there is no sin. But, we should recall, the Solarians are not fully free of the practice insofar as

42 “Postquam enim homo peccavit in natura corrupta, servitus et dominatio facta sunt,” Campanella, 1637, Q.1, a.2, p. 80.

43 “virtuosus enim facit homines bonos, dum eis utitur: docet enim et servat, et fovet, doctrina, exemplo, oratione, correctione,” Campanella 1637, Q.1, a.2, p. 80.

captive belligerents are kept (even if only temporarily) as slaves outside the city walls. In the fourth of the *Quaestiones*, Campanella recognizes that the city is not without sin: "I say that this is the truly best life [...]. Sins will be present, but not the grave ones as found in other places, nor even the kind that might ruin the commonwealth."⁴⁴ The city is almost without sin, as it is quite nearly without slavery. The Solarian way of life does not quite achieve the fullness of prelapsarian purity. Elsewhere, Campanella's vision perhaps is more enthusiastic: "all are by nature free, but one becomes a slave through sin and ignorance. But if at the beginning there had not been original sin, we would all live as if in our Republic, described in the *City of the Sun*, [...] we would all be limbs to each the other, and for each would be good that duty connatural to him; and we would live by right, which posits equality, not dominion."⁴⁵ (Campanella leaves out, prudently, the Solarian practice of sharing wives.) Campanella's city does not offer a portrait of the original state of innocence, but rather represents a way of life which

has come very close to recovering such a state by cleansing its citizens of vice. He says, "in our republic, consciences would be made serene, avarice—the root of all evils—done away with."⁴⁶

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The way of life described in the *City of the Sun* is more just and more humane due to drastic measures that cleanse its citizens of monstrous vice and eliminate the gravest sins, rendering that way of life in conformity with reason and with nature. Campanella rejects any distinction among men between natural master and natural slave, and is repulsed by Aristotle's exclusion of the artisans from citizenship; Campanella insists that such craftsmen are not only capable of virtue and happiness, but also are owed proper respect and honor for their expertise. Artisans, in fact, become kings in their own craft insofar as they possess a piece of wisdom.⁴⁷ Armed with scripture and the Christian conception of sin, Campanella can truly diagnose the tyrant—the violent, illegitimate ruler—actually to be a slave, dispensing with any analogy. Complete and arbitrary license, for Campanella, inevitably results in tyranny with respect to others and servitude with respect to self. The condition of legal and political servitude is a secondary signification of slavery for Campanella, and becomes possible (and sometimes

44 "Dico etiam hanc etiam esse vitam optimam, [...]. Peccata aderunt, sed non gravia, ut in caeteris, nec quae saltem rempublicam pessundent," Campanella 1637, Q.4, a.1, p. 103.

45 "Omnis est liber natura, sed peccato et stultitia fit servus. Si autem non praecessisset peccatum originale, omnes viveremus sicuti in republica nostra De civitate solis inscripta, licet dubium sit de uxoribus quas communes non ponerem. At omnes essemus alter alterius membra, et bonum esset unicuique munus sibi connaturale, et iure, quod ponit aequalitatem, non dominio, quod imparitatem, viveremus," Campanella 1637, Q.1, a.2, ad.2, p. 82.

46 "Ergo ex nostra Republica serenantur conscientiae, tollitur avaritia radix omnium malorum [...]," Campanella 1637, Q.4, a.2, p. 106.

47 "Quod omnis artifex est Rex in sua arte, quoniam habet particulam sapientiae," Campanella 1637, Q.1, a.2, p. 81.

permitted) only in the postlapsarian state. So long as they are good and virtuous, Aesop, Diogenes, and Plato would never truly be slaves even if they were sold into a legal state of servitude. One of course cannot but draw a parallel between the state of servitude and imprisonment, and recall Campanella's own unfortunate circumstances as well as

his estimation concerning the radical freedom and strength of the will: man possesses such freedom that he can even utter profanities against God.⁴⁸ In his discussions of rule and dominion, right and violation, servitude and sin, does not Campanella accomplish what Plato could only suggest by way of images? Is not the true tyrant, now, truly a slave?

48 "homo est adeo liber quod etiam blasphemat Deum," Campanella 2008, p. 159.

ABBREVIATIONS

Aristotle

<i>Catg.</i>	<i>Categories</i>
<i>GA</i>	<i>Generation of Animals</i>
<i>Meta.</i>	<i>Metaphysics</i>
<i>NE</i>	<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>
<i>Pol.</i>	<i>Politics</i>
<i>Prob.</i>	<i>Problems</i>
<i>Rhet.</i>	<i>Rhetoric</i>

Plato

<i>Alc. 1</i>	<i>Alcibiades 1</i>
<i>Clit.</i>	<i>Clitophon</i>
<i>Prot.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	<i>Republic</i>

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